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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-2255 
____________ 
 
DENNIS JOHN CAMPBELL, 
        Appellant, 
v. 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
__________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-00453) 
District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 3, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Dennis Campbell has collected Social Security disability (SSDI) 
benefits since 1999 for psychological problems.  Campbell first applied for disability 
benefits in 1995; this application was denied.  Campbell also applied for benefits from 
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the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs.1  This application was rejected in July, 
2008 for insufficient evidence of a job-related stress disorder.  To challenge that OWCP 
decision, and possibly also to challenge the current amount of his SSDI benefits and the 
denial of benefits in 1995, Campbell and his wife went to the Philadelphia office of the 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) in August, 2008 to review his complete agency 
file.  Specifically, Campbell was looking for information from his 1995 file, possibly 
including, but not limited to, his application, records from the County Mental Health 
Hospital in San Diego, a State of California disability determination, an SSA Form 831, a 
Psychiatric Review Technique Form, and the SSA’s October 11, 1995 decision denying 
reconsideration.   
The couple were not immediately successful in obtaining the information they 
wanted, because Campbell’s records evidently were stored by the SSA in Baltimore, 
Maryland.  Campbell filed a civil action pro se in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania against the SSA, which was transferred to the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  Campbell then filed an amended complaint, claiming violations 
of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), the Privacy Act, and the Social Security 
Act, as well as a violation of his procedural due process rights and unlawful retaliation.  
Campbell sought declaratory relief, money damages, and an order directing the SSA to 
produce his agency records.  The SSA filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, 
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, in which it argued that Campbell’s claims 
                                              
1
 Campbell was terminated from his job with the United States Postal Service in March, 
1992. 
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were now moot because it had since produced to Campbell all the documents – some 570 
pages – associated with his Social Security number that the SSA could identify and 
retrieve.  The SSA attached to its motion several affidavits from SSA employees detailing 
the thorough searches they conducted for Campbell’s records. 
 Campbell opposed the SSA’s motion, arguing that the documents produced did not 
include certain medical records he had submitted to the agency when he originally 
applied for benefits.  The missing records raised Campbell’s suspicions, and so he filed a 
motion to amend the complaint to add claims of fraud and fraudulent concealment against 
the SSA.  The District Court granted this motion and denied the SSA’s motion to dismiss 
without prejudice.  Campbell then filed his Third Amended Complaint, adding new 
claims for retaliation for lawsuits filed by his wife; for a violation of the Social Security 
Independence Program Improvements Act of 1994; for fraud and fraudulent concealment; 
for violations of the Code of Federal Regulations; and for negligent failure to maintain 
records with accuracy.  
 The District Court issued an order giving the parties notice of its intent to convert 
the SSA’s motion into one for summary judgment.  See generally Rose v. Bartle, 871 
F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 1989) (District Court must give parties adequate notice that 
motion to dismiss would be converted to motion for summary judgment).  The parties 
were given additional time to prepare, and eventually Campbell submitted a brief 
opposing summary judgment, as well as 64 supporting exhibits.   
In an order entered on March 9, 2010, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to the SSA.  The District Court noted that, with respect to the FOIA and 
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Privacy Act claims, Campbell was seeking his entire SSA file, including all of his 
medical records, but, although he was dissatisfied with the SSA’s response, he had no 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the SSA was deliberately withholding any records.  
The court determined that Campbell’s FOIA and Privacy Act claims were moot.  With 
respect to his negligent maintenance of records claim, the District Court noted that a 
plaintiff seeking damages, must demonstrate that the agency’s actions were “intentional 
or willful,” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C).  The court then determined that Campbell had 
failed to bring forward any evidence that SSA had acted in a manner which was 
intentional or willful.  Specifically, Campbell’s assertion that his wife discovered some 
documents in her SSA file that should have been in his file, if true, established nothing 
more than negligence, and negligence is an insufficient basis for an award of damages 
under the Privacy Act. 
The District Court determined that Campbell’s remaining claims lacked merit.  His 
due process claim against the agency was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  
Any claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act that the SSA intentionally and willfully 
withheld his records in retaliation for his wife having filed two lawsuits against the 
Commissioner of Social Security would have to first be presented to the agency, 28 
U.S.C. § 2675(a), and Campbell had not complied with this prerequisite to suit.  In 
addition, the statute allows for a recalculation of benefits only where fraud on the part of 
the applicant is suspected, 42 U.S.C. § 405(u)(1)(A).  The Social Security Independence 
Program Improvements Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-8, provides only that the Commissioner 
may seek money damages against anyone who makes false or misleading representations 
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during Social Security  proceedings.  Accordingly, Campbell’s claims under those 
provisions were not cognizable.  Last, none of the federal regulations cited by Campbell, 
which concerned the SSA’s procedures for requests for medical records and procedures 
for receiving medical records, provided either a cause of action for damages, grounds for 
an order requiring the SSA to change its policies, or any authority to retroactively award 
disability benefits.  Campbell appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment is plenary.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-
23 (1986).  Summary judgment is proper only if it appears “that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).  A genuine issue of material fact is one that could change the 
outcome of the litigation.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).  
 In his brief, Campbell contends that the District Court wrongly concluded that he 
abandoned his FOIA claim in his Third Amended Complaint, erred in stating that the first 
time he noted that he suffers from serious psychological problems was in the Third 
Amended Complaint, erred in finding insufficient evidence to show that the SSA violated 
FOIA and the Privacy Act, erred in granting summary judgment to the SSA on the 
negligently maintained records claim, erred in addressing his retaliation claims, and erred 
by not expressly addressing his futility argument. 
 We will affirm.  As a threshold matter, Campbell’s contentions on appeal that the 
District Court wrongly concluded that he had abandoned his FOIA claim in the Third 
Amended Complaint, and erred in stating that the first time he noted that he suffers from 
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psychological problems was in the Third Amended Complaint, do not provide a basis for 
upsetting summary judgment in favor of the SSA.  Whether or not the District Court 
thought it likely that the claim had been abandoned, the court fully analyzed Campbell’s 
FOIA claim on the merits in reaching its mootness determination.  Any error was thus 
harmless.  Similarly, even if the District Court overlooked Campbell’s references in his 
First Amended Complaint to his psychological impairments, any oversight was harmless 
because it had no bearing on any of the District Court’s determinations. 
 We turn then to the main contentions on appeal.  Both the Privacy Act and FOIA 
require federal agencies to permit individuals to gain access to certain records, and both 
create a private cause of action for the failure to do so.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) 
(Privacy Act); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (FOIA).  We conclude that summary judgment for 
the SSA on the FOIA and Privacy Act claims was proper.  With respect to documents 
that were produced, the action is moot.  See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2000).  To the extent that Campbell is dissatisfied with 
what was produced, to meet its burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the agency must demonstrate that it has conducted a “search reasonably calculated 
to uncover all relevant documents.”  Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 
1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The question is whether the search for the documents 
requested was adequate.  See id. at 1351.  In demonstrating that the agency’s search was 
adequate, the agency may rely on detailed, nonconclusory affidavits submitted in good 
faith.  See id.   
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The affidavits submitted with the SSA’s motion for summary judgment 
demonstrate that the agency’s search was reasonable, just as the District Court concluded.  
We have carefully reviewed Campbell’s 64 exhibits offered in opposition to the SSA’s 
motion for summary judgment, and specifically those exhibits listed in his brief, see 
Appellant’s Brief, at 14, but nothing in Campbell’s exhibits supports his contention that 
the SSA withheld documents from him.  The absence of a Form 831, a Psychiatric 
Review Technique Form, his treating psychiatrist’s report, a State of California disability 
determination, and the other items Campbell believes should have been in an old file, 
does not establish, for purposes of defeating a summary judgment motion, that the SSA’s 
search was not reasonable or that any documents were improperly withheld. 
Campbell understandably contends that his SSA file was improperly maintained 
because it did not contain all of the items he believes should have been in his file.  But, as 
the District Court noted, an action for damages for improperly maintained records must 
be based on evidence that the SSA’s conduct was intentional or willful.  A civil remedy is 
available whenever an agency “fails to maintain any record concerning any individual 
with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure 
fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or 
opportunities of, or benefits to the individual … and consequently a determination is 
made which is adverse to the individual….”  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C).  A plaintiff 
seeking damages under this section must demonstrate that the agency’s actions were 
“intentional or willful.”  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4); Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 361-62 
(4th Cir. 1999).  See also Waters v. Thornburgh, 888 F.2d 870, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (an 
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act committed without grounds for believing it to be lawful, or by flagrantly disregarding 
others’ rights, is intentional under the Privacy Act).  As the District Court correctly 
concluded, there was no record evidence to support an assertion of willful or intentional 
conduct on the part of the SSA.  Accordingly, summary judgment for the SSA was 
proper.  Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of 
fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact …, the court may *** (3) 
grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials – including the facts 
considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it.”).  
Campbell also contends that the SSA’s purported negligent maintenance of his 
records was in retaliation for his wife’s lawsuits against the SSA.  He argues on appeal 
that, contrary to the District Court’s determination, he did in fact exhaust his FTCA 
administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation claims, see Appellant’s Brief, at 
15-16, and he informed the District Court in a pleading the court struck.  We note that 
Campbell’s Exhibit 57 is a February 3, 2009 letter to his wife from the SSA denying their 
billion dollar FTCA claim for tampering with his medical insurance, fabricating SSA 
internal memos, and contacting his minor child’s school without permission, and advising 
that any appeal of the determination would lie in the appropriate federal district court.  
Nevertheless, this item does not necessarily establish that the retaliation claim itself was 
administratively exhausted.   
In any event, we can affirm the District Court on any basis which finds support in 
the record, Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980).  First, the 
District Court properly struck the Second Amended Complaint, wherein Campbell 
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actually raised an FTCA retaliation claim and asserted that he had exhausted his 
administrative remedies.  “A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course . . . 
before being served with a responsive pleading,” Fed.  R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(1), but, after 
that, a party must have the opposing party’s written consent or leave of court, see id. at 
15(a)(2).  Campbell had neither written consent nor a court order.  Second, in granting 
summary judgment on the Third Amended Complaint, the District Court observed that 
Campbell offered no statutory basis for his retaliation claim.  We agree that Campbell 
offered no statutory basis for his retaliation claim in his Third Amended Complaint.  See 
Third Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 92-98.  The retaliation claim raised in the Third 
Amended Complaint was not expressly based on the FTCA, and thus it was unnecessary 
to reach the FTCA exhaustion question.  As a constitutional claim, Campbell’s 
allegations of retaliation cannot proceed because he sued only the Social Security 
Administration, and, as the District Court noted with respect to his procedural due 
process claim, a suit for damages against the United States without its consent is barred 
by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  See Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 717 
(3d Cir. 1979).  Accordingly, summary judgment on the retaliation claim was proper. 
 Campbell’s contention on appeal that the District Court failed to discuss his 
futility argument does not provide a basis for overturning summary judgment.  The basis 
of Campbell’s contention is not completely clear from his brief, but we note that he 
argued in his Third Amended Complaint that it would be futile for him to exhaust 
administrative remedies under the Privacy Act.  See Third Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 68-
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72.  The District Court addressed Campbell’s Privacy Act claim on the merits.  It 
therefore was unnecessary for the District Court to discuss his futility argument.   
Last, we agree with the District Court, for the reasons given by the District Court, 
that Campbell’s claims for fraud and fraudulent concealment, and his claim under the 
Social Security Independence Program Improvements Act, are not cognizable, and that 
none of the SSA regulations cited by Campbell provide a basis in this lawsuit for 
retroactively awarding him disability benefits.  To the extent Campbell seeks to challenge 
the SSA’s 1995 and 1999 benefits decisions, section 405(g) of title 42 provides the 
exclusive avenue for judicial review of the SSA’s determinations.   See Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1977). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order awarding 
summary judgment to the Social Security Administration.  Appellant’s motion to file a 
supplemental appendix is granted.  Appellant’s motion to set aside and/or strike, etc., and 
motion for sanctions is denied. 
